bastian/teamwallet
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Actions Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

feat: secure admin user management

Browse Source
This commit is contained in:
Bastian Wagner
2026-07-31 23:37:54 +02:00
parent 4105460400
commit e6acfdcac7
22 changed files with 1598 additions and 148 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

122
.superpowers/sdd/admin-user-management/task-2-report.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
# Task 2 Report: Backend admin mutations and authentication enforcement
## Status
Implemented and verified on top of Task 1 commit `4105460`.
## Delivered API
- Added versioned global-admin controller at `admin/users` (effective path follows the existing global `/api` prefix and URI versioning).
- Added narrow mutations:
- `PATCH admin/users/:id/profile` (`firstName`, `lastName` only)
- `PATCH admin/users/:id/role` (strict numeric `RoleEnum.admin|user` ID)
- `PATCH admin/users/:id/status` (strict numeric `StatusEnum.active|inactive` ID)
- `PUT admin/users/:userId/players/:playerId`
- `DELETE admin/users/:userId/players/:playerId`
- Added `GET admin/users/players` with search, optional `teamId`, `all|assigned|unassigned`, page, and limit.
- Kept `GET users/directory` as the user list source. Removed superseded generic user create/read/update/delete handlers that exposed unsafe/raw shapes or bypassed the narrow mutation safeguards.
- Removed `DELETE auth/me`, which could race with a promotion and bypass last-admin protection.
## TDD RED evidence
The following failures were observed before their production implementations:
1. `npm test -- --runInBand admin-users.controller.spec.ts`
- Failed to compile because `AdminUsersController` and the narrow DTOs did not exist.
2. `npm test -- --runInBand admin-users.service.spec.ts`
- Failed to compile because `AdminUsersService` did not exist.
3. `npm test -- --runInBand auth.service.spec.ts jwt.strategy.spec.ts`
- Inactive password login produced the ordinary password failure, social login issued a token, logs contained email/token values, and `JwtStrategy` accepted only the JWT snapshot.
4. `npm test -- --runInBand AddPlayerLookupIndexes.spec.ts`
- Failed to compile because the reversible lookup-index migration did not exist.
5. `npm test -- --runInBand auth.service.spec.ts auth.controller.spec.ts`
- `GET auth/me` had no JWT guard and the service accepted/refreshed an inactive user.
6. `npm test -- --runInBand users.controller.security.spec.ts`
- Generic `UsersController` mutations were still present and bypassed the new invariants.
7. `npm test -- --runInBand admin-users.service.spec.ts -t "updates only names"`
- The locked user lookup did not use alias-scoped `FOR UPDATE`, exposing a PostgreSQL outer-join runtime failure.
8. `npm test -- --runInBand admin-users.controller.spec.ts -t "reverse-map"`
- Numeric enum reverse-map names such as `"admin"` passed validation.
9. `npm test -- --runInBand logging.service.spec.ts admin-users.service.spec.ts -t "caller transaction manager|updates only names"`
- Audit logging had no transaction-manager support and ran after commit.
10. `npm test -- --runInBand auth.service.spec.ts admin-users.service.spec.ts -t "serializes email confirmation|explicit paginated player"`
- Email confirmation had no row-lock transaction, and a numeric driver boolean was returned as `1` instead of `true`.
Every production behavior above was added only after the corresponding expected RED was captured.
## Final GREEN evidence
- Focused backend tests:
- Command: `npm test -- --runInBand users.service.spec.ts users.controller.security.spec.ts admin-users.controller.spec.ts admin-users.service.spec.ts auth.controller.spec.ts auth.service.spec.ts jwt.strategy.spec.ts logging.service.spec.ts AddPlayerLookupIndexes.spec.ts`
- Result: **9 suites passed, 40 tests passed, 0 failed**.
- Targeted lint across every touched backend TypeScript file:
- Command: direct project ESLint invocation over 21 touched source/spec files.
- Result: **exit 0, no findings**.
- Backend build:
- Command: `npm run build`
- Result: **exit 0**.
- Migration up/down smoke coverage:
- Exact `CREATE INDEX` and reverse-order `DROP INDEX` SQL asserted in `AddPlayerLookupIndexes.spec.ts`.
- TypeORM entity index metadata asserted to match both migration names.
- Diff checks:
- `git diff --check`: **exit 0**.
- Both frontend directories: **no changes**.
## Security and concurrency design
- The controller is class-level protected by JWT auth, `RolesGuard`, and `Roles([RoleEnum.admin])`.
- Mutation DTOs are narrow and whitelisted. Role/status accept only strict numeric IDs, avoiding class-validator numeric-enum reverse-map strings.
- Role and status changes execute in transactions and lock the active-admin set in stable user-ID order. This serializes concurrent demotions/deactivations so the last active admin cannot be lost.
- Self-demotion and self-deactivation are rejected inside the locked transaction.
- User row locks use explicit query builders with `FOR UPDATE OF` the user alias. Role/status are loaded with left joins, preserving support for nullable relations without asking PostgreSQL to lock nullable joined rows.
- Deactivation changes only `User.status` and revokes any outstanding confirmation hash; it does not alter `Player.user`.
- Email confirmation locks the same user row and re-checks the hash inside its transaction. This serializes confirmation against administrative deactivation and prevents an old/racing confirmation link from reactivating a deactivated account.
- Assignment and reassignment lock the player row before changing `Player.user`; unlink verifies the locked row is still linked to the requested user.
- All mutation responses are explicit Task 1-compatible admin summaries. Player search uses its own explicit player/team/current-user projection. Password, hash, social ID, and tokens are never mapped.
- Admin audit events contain actor ID in `userId` and target/action IDs in details. Audit insertion uses the same transaction manager as the mutation, so an audit failure rolls back the security-sensitive change.
- Password and social login reject inactive accounts. `JwtStrategy` reloads the non-deleted database user on every request, rejects inactive/missing users, and returns the current database role/status rather than trusting token role claims.
- `GET auth/me` is JWT guarded and independently checks current active status before any refresh behavior.
## Files
### Added
- `src/users/admin-users.controller.ts`
- `src/users/admin-users.controller.spec.ts`
- `src/users/admin-users.service.ts`
- `src/users/admin-users.service.spec.ts`
- `src/users/users.controller.security.spec.ts`
- `src/users/dto/admin-user.dto.ts`
- `src/users/dto/admin-player-response.dto.ts`
- `src/auth/auth.controller.spec.ts`
- `src/auth/auth.service.spec.ts`
- `src/auth/strategies/jwt.strategy.spec.ts`
- `src/database/migrations/1785517200000-AddPlayerLookupIndexes.ts`
- `src/database/migrations/AddPlayerLookupIndexes.spec.ts`
### Modified
- `src/users/users.controller.ts`
- `src/users/users.module.ts`
- `src/auth/auth.controller.ts`
- `src/auth/auth.service.ts`
- `src/auth/strategies/jwt.strategy.ts`
- `src/database/logging/logging.service.ts`
- `src/database/logging/logging.service.spec.ts`
- `src/database/logging/model/logging-event.type.ts`
- `src/players/entities/player.entity.ts`
## Self-review
- Checked every endpoint for server-side global-admin authorization and removed legacy mutation bypasses.
- Checked response construction for password/hash/social-ID/token leakage.
- Checked role/status races, lock acquisition order, nullable-relation SQL shape, player reassignment ownership, and confirmation/deactivation ordering.
- Checked all touched logging details for email, password, token, hash, or social-ID values.
- Checked migration names against entity metadata and down ordering.
- Confirmed no frontend changes.
## Concerns / follow-up
- The lock/concurrency and migration tests are focused unit/SQL-shape tests; no live PostgreSQL instance was available for a two-connection race test or an actual migration run/revert. A database-backed integration test remains advisable before production rollout.
- Removing superseded generic user CRUD/read routes and `DELETE auth/me` is intentionally security-hardening and may affect undocumented external clients. Repository frontend searches showed no use of those removed routes.
- Full unrelated backend test-suite repair was intentionally out of scope; the focused Task 1 + Task 2 suite and backend build are green.